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Securing the Global City: Crime, Consulting, Risk,
and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space
KATHARYNE MITCHELL* & KATHERINE BECKETT**
ABSTRACT
The last decade has witnessed the rise of private transnational institutions that
increasingly influence the organization and management of urban space. Two institu-
tions are especially powerful in this regard: bond-rating agencies and global security
firms. Bolstered by a discourse of risk and the need to securitize cities, these institutions
have garnered enormous amounts of power with respect to urban social and spatial
control. They are implicated in the imprisonment and displacement of marginalized
populations, the intensification ofgentrification, and general shifts in municipal fund-
ing priorities. The authors illustrate these themes through a case study of New York
City, followed by an example of the transnational movement of these forces and their
exportation to sites such as Mexico City.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary globalization is often described as a process involving height-
ened interdependencies between different regions of the world, as well as a grow-
ing transnational movement of capital, people, and goods. Over the past few
decades, a number of institutions arose to enable and facilitate these movements
and to aid in the global expansion of free-market ideas and practices. These trans-
national institutions can be broadly characterized as "neoliberal" as a result of
their promulgation of market-based strategies for managing this movement and
for controlling the places and populations implicated in these new cross-border
relationships.
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In this paper we examine two such institutions: bond-rating agencies and the
global security industry. Beginning with a case study of an American city that
was profoundly disciplined and regulated in the 19 7 0s, and again in the 1990s, we
show how these disciplinary processes transmigrated more recently to Mexico,
specifically with respect to the management of the urban spaces and populations
of Mexico City. Examining the impact of these institutions and ideas across bor-
ders illuminates two dynamics: (1) the policies and practices through which
American interests and priorities are exported around the globe and (2) the mul-
tiple ways that neoliberalism is disseminated as an ideology of effective and neu-
tral governance through its active spatial extension and entrenchment.
Neoliberalism is generally understood as involving both market liberaliza-
tion and some degree of authoritarian control.' States are narrated as active, often
coercive forces in these processes, both through withdrawing the social provisions
of an earlier, Keynesian or "welfarist" moment, as well as through the vigorous
creation of new conditions of privatization and deregulation through which mar-
kets expand.2 What is less commonly studied is the manner in which private
transnational institutions are now usurping or co-producing many of these for-
mer state-based functions of marketization and coercion. These private institu-
tions and public-private partnerships effectively undermine democratic autonomy
at the same time that they facilitate and entrench neoliberal market expansion
and population control. In what follows, we briefly describe the rise of these two
U.S.-dominated transnational industries. The second section examines how these
institutions affected, and in the case of the transnational crime consulting indus-
try, emerged from, developments in New York City. The final section explores
the subsequent exportation of these institutional practices and orthodoxies to
Mexico, and suggests that the implications of this shift in power for cities world-
wide are enormous, especially with respect to municipal autonomy, democratic
representation, and the welfare of marginalized urban populations.
I. RISK AND RATINGS, CRIME AND CONSULTING: THE RISE OF Two KEY
TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Bonds are contracts in which an investor agrees to lend money and a bor-
rower agrees to return that money in specified amounts at a scheduled time.
Bond-rating agencies rate the ability and willingness of the borrower to follow the
1. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
2. See Jamie Peck & Adam Tickell, Neoliberalizing Space, 34 ANTIPODE 380 (2002).
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terms of that contract.3 While public or "sovereign" bonds have been used as
methods of raising money for centuries, only since the early twentieth century
have corporate bonds, and subsequently municipal bonds, become significant
components of the bond market.
Corporate bonds originated to help finance the expansion of the U.S. rail-
roads; they are commonly depicted as an "American financial innovation"' that
did not operate internationally on a large scale until the 1970s. Moody's, the first
bond-rating agency, was a U.S. firm started to provide information to lenders in-
terested in investing in these railroad bonds. This U.S. dominance has continued
into the present, with the three largest agencies headquartered in New York City,
and hundreds of offices now operating overseas.5
The tremendous growth of bond-rating companies over the past three de-
cades is the direct result of globalization and financial liberalization.6 With the
collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the renewal of floating exchange rates,
capital moved more freely and rapidly across international borders.7 At the same
time, the disintermediation of banks meant that capital markets loaned money
directly to borrowers, including bond issuers.' With banks absorbing less of the
risk associated with lending, the assessments of risk made by bond-rating agen-
cies grew in importance, and these companies expanded tremendously in power
and prestige over the next three decades.9
Concern about the risks associated with transnational credit markets have
become tied to greater demands for global security, both of financial instruments
3. E.g., Richard Sylla, A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 19, 21 (Richard Levich et al. eds., 2002).
4. Id. at 22.
5. The two largest agencies are Moody's Investor Services, and Standard & Poor's. Fitch, at
third place, is owned by the French company FIMALAC, and has dual headquarters in New York
and London. Regulatory structures imposed since the 1970s have favored the older and larger
bond-ratings firms over newer entries, leading to a near monopoly by the big three. See Lawrence
J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING
AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM,Supra note 3, at 41, 45-46.
6. See TIMOTHY SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES
AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2005).
7. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SHIFT IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY (4th ed. 2003).
8. See SINCLAIR, supra note 6.
9. As of 2000, Moody's coverage reached $30 trillion in debt issuances (ratings and analysis),
and S&P was in excess of $11 trillion in debt issuances. Moody's had 15,000 structured transac-
tions, maintained 4,200 corporate relationships, and operated in more than 100 countries. See
White, supra note 5, at 45.
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and physical environments. Bond-rating agencies seem to provide this financial
security for lenders, who desire precise, detailed, highly graded computations of
risk in making their own calculations. In investigating municipal credit worthi-
ness, the agencies base their ratings on financial and management history, and the
economic outlook of the city. Despite the highly subjective quality of many judg-
ments, the agencies promote a sense of neutrality and rationality in making these
assessments. This imparts a weightiness and gravitas to the assessments that make
them difficult to dispute. These assessments have had particularly strong ramifi-
cations in the areas of municipal bond issuances and ratings.
According to Jason Hackworth, the ratings agencies have become especially
influential for urban development and socioeconomic organization because of
three intertwined forces." First, general disinvestment in cities by the federal gov-
ernment has forced city governments and public authorities to borrow more (by
issuing bonds) in order to provide the same basic services that were formerly cov-
ered by federal dollars. The second force comes from the increased investment of
pension funds, money market funds, and other institutions in diversified financial
portfolios. Laws that limit the amounts of speculative grade (or high-risk) debt
that these types of institutions can hold have made the ratings of bonds increas-
ingly important. "Given the increased presence of funds with such limitations,
the judgments of rating agencies have ipsofacto become more important because
there are fewer bond buyers willing and legally able to ignore their assessments." 2
Finally, banks today lend at far lower rates than previously, and many capital
market lenders now absorb risk directly. This has led to an increased desire for
professional assessments in order to reduce the perceived riskiness of direct (non-
intermediated) loans.
In assessing risk, both the lenders and the agencies look for strong fiscal dis-
cipline as a primary criterion of a secure, low-risk investment option. This de-
mand for fiscal discipline in the financial markets has been accompanied by
increased regulation and surveillance by government, and also by private consor-
tiums such as banks, regulatory agencies, and conservative think tanks. 3 New
apparatuses of private and public-private surveillance and regulation have also
10. See SINCLAIR,sUpra note 6.
11. See JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT
IN AMERICAN URBANISM (2007).
12. Id. at 24.
13. SINCLAIR,SUpra note 6, at 1-15. For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
the American Enterprise Institute, and the bond-rating agencies themselves have all increased
their regulation and surveillance.
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emerged in the risk-reduction management of physical environments such as
urban spaces and infrastructure. As a result, the work of bond-rating agencies
often reinforces the perceived need to hire some of America's "top cops" to help
local authorities impose order and discipline on urban residents; the financial
security of a city was dependent on its physical security.
II. THE GLOBAL SECURITY INDUSTRY
Consulting firms are an important part of the multibillion dollar transna-
tional security industry. These firms offer consulting services to private and pub-
lic entities seeking to enhance their security on issues ranging from geological
threats to terrorism. The industry received a significant boost after 9/11, because
"a growing crop of security consultants has sprung up to help major corporations
increase their defenses. ' 14 Worldwide, private spending on security is estimated to
be greater than $50 billion.'
A small but expanding subset of this industry offers consulting services pri-
marily to federal, state, and local governments seeking to reduce crime and disor-
der. While many of the security consulting firms identify corporations as their
target market, firms such as Giuliani Partners and The Bratton Group L.L.C.
also seek to influence regional and municipal policing practices and crime poli-
cies. Although these consulting groups comprise a small portion of the growing
transnational security sector, their focus on public policy-and the fact that they
are often funded by wealthy business leaders and groups-raises important ques-
tions about democratic governance. 6
The fact that several of the most prominent of these firms so aggressively
promote the "New York model" is also controversial. The New York model is the
approach to crime and disorder taken in New York City under Mayor Giuliani
based on a particular interpretation of "broken windows policing." This model
justified an especially aggressive law enforcement approach to a number of urban
social problems. It is this law enforcement approach that has been exported by
leading transnational security consulting firms. In particular, former New York
14. Paul Magnusson & Spencer E. Ante, The Booming Security Business: Anti-Terrorism Consul-
tants are Cleaning up as Companies Everywhere Boost Spending, Bus. WK., July 25, 2005, at 30.
15. Id.
16. As Bratton said in reference to his consulting arrangement with the city of Caracas, Venezu-
ela, "What is unique about this is the embracing of the initiative by the private sector; that's truly
a watershed moment in Venezuela and maybe in Latin America." Andy Webb-Vidal, New York
Supercop Takes a Crack at Caracas, FIN. TIMES, March 22, 2001, at 3.
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Police Chief William J. Bratton's consulting group, The Bratton Group, L.L.C.,
and Giuliani Partners have offered their expertise regarding crime and security to
public officials in Mexico and South America.
The work of these and other transnational security consulting firms has coin-
cided with a push by the conservative think tank, the Manhattan Institute, to
"share ideas for urban renewal with leaders in Latin America."17 The Manhattan
Institute provided the intellectual rationale for Giuliani's revolution and now has
a new office in Santiago, Chile. In addition, the think tank recently began the
Inter-American Policy Exchange, a new initiative to promote zero tolerance polic-
ing, educational reform (i.e. vouchers), and pro-business tax reform in Latin
American cities.18 As one New York Times journalist put it, "At times it seems
that Latin American leaders cannot get enough of the Institute and its ideas."'"
The Institute's ideas were, it purports, tested and proven successful under the
leadership of Rudolph (Rudy) W. Giuliani in New York City. Indeed, the New
York model revealed the importance of bond-rating institutions and laid the
foundation for a portion of the transnational security consulting sector. The next
section explicates the New York City experience in greater detail.
A. Bonds, Politics, and Security in New York City
New York City's financial woes of the 1970s were not unique. The city expe-
rienced problems that were plaguing many older northeast cities in the United
States during this time, including the loss of its manufacturing base, demographic
shifts, and a major federal disinvestment in economic and social programs." Ear-
lier waves of suburbanization in the post-war period, encouraged by development
subsidies in the form of highway construction and tax breaks, spurred the move-
ment of primarily white, middle-class city-dwellers to the new suburbs ringing
the city.2' This "white flight" left a population behind that was dependent on the
17. Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, President's Welcome, http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/iape.htm (last visited June 9, 2007).
18. See Anthony DePalma, The Americas Court a Group that Changed New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2002, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/-nyt-the-americas.htm.
19. Id.
20. See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FISCAL CRISIS
(1982).
21. See Richard A. Walker, A Theory of Suburbanization: Capitalism and the Construction of
Urban Space in the United States, in URBANIZATION AND URBAN PLANNING IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY
383 (1981).
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fast-disappearing light manufacturing jobs in the city, and also on the social ser-
vices provided to recent immigrants and others relying on cheap and efficient
transportation, affordable housing, and free education.22
The economic and demographic restructuring of this period led to reduced
taxes for city coffers at the same time that the federal government was reducing its
involvement in service provisioning.23 The combination of these factors increased
municipal debt and the necessity of borrowing more money through banks and
the issuance of municipal bonds. 4 Numerous local banks were involved in this
process as both lenders and underwriters of bonds, and made a significant profit
through much of the early 1970s, especially as the city's financial problems be-
came increasingly public and interest rates began to soar.2 In contrast, the city
went further and further into debt as its service expenses rose. Between 1974 and
1975 alone these expenses jumped nearly 3 percent.2 6
The issuance and rating of bonds played an increasingly important role dur-
ing this time period. With the municipal deficit growing on a yearly basis, the
impending financial crisis was staved off temporarily through the issuance of
more and more short-term bonds ("notes") to cover the longer-term debt. This
"long default" stretched on for several painful months between 1974 and 1975,
and provided the opening for the financial community to take stronger control
over city resources and fiscal allocations, including through the formation of the
Financial Community Liaison Group (FCLG) in January 1975. "The overt func-
tion of the FCLG was to establish a formal mechanism through which the finan-
cial community and the city could cooperatively work to reopen the municipal
22. Manufacturing employment peaked at 1,073,000 workers in 1947. Between 1950 and 1980,
manufacturing jobs in New York City declined from 30 percent of payroll employment to 15 per-
cent, a loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs. See TABB, supra note 20, at 75. The decline of light
manufacturing and the conversion of thousands of manufacturing lofts to residences during this
time were encouraged by municipal zoning changes and tax abatements for developers. See SHA-
RON ZUKIN, LOFT LIVING: CULTURE AND CAPITAL IN URBAN CHANGE (1982).
23. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 1, at 44-48 (discussing the New York City crime crisis as a key
moment in the repudiation of the former Keynesian principals of demand-side intervention and
regulation and the beginning of the neoliberal, market-oriented era).
24. See MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRisis/FiSCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF NEW
YORK CITY 108 (1992).
25. See ERIC LICHTEN, CLASS, POWER AND AUSTERITY: THE NEW YORK CITY FISCAL CRISIS (1986);
see also SHEFTER, supra note 24, at 108 (arguing that the "healthy fees and commissions they earned
for their services" made New York's commercial banks loathe to ask many questions about the
city's financial practices).
26. SHEFTER, SUpra note 24, at 104.
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credit markets to the city. Essentially, however, this committee sought to establish
the power of finance capital over the city's fiscal affairs."
27
Following the establishment of the FCLG, a municipal bond analyst for
Weeden and Company outlined the city's fiscal problems and suggested a number
of solutions. These included the mass firings of municipal employees, the takeover
of the city's fiscal affairs by financial managers, and a structural reorganization of
the city similar to those done in bankruptcy proceedings.2" The formation of the
FCLG and these suggestions were just the first of a series of changes that became
more austere and coercive as the crisis deepened over the course of the year.
One of the events precipitating the worst moments of the crisis was the down-
grading of the city's bonds. In April 1975, Standard and Poor's (S&P) suspended
its bond-ratings, and in October 1975, Moody's downgraded the city twice, from
A to Ba to Caa.29 The second move propelled municipal bonds into speculative
grade status, essentially making them unmarketable and instantly bankrupting
the city. From this point on, the city lost almost all control over the allocation of its
resources and future planning options. The new agencies that were brought in to
help restructure municipal finances and general spending priorities earlier in the
year were essentially given carte blanche in their municipal rescue."' Thus the
changing bond market and bond-ratings were key to the ensuing loss of auton-
omy for the city. As stated by the conservative think tank, The American Enter-
prise Institute, "Although it is difficult to pinpoint the time when the financial
problems facing New York City stopped being problems and started being a cri-
sis, one may safely assume that the crisis had been reached early in 1975 when the
city's bonds and notes could not be sold at any reasonable price."3
Following the near fiscal default of New York City in 1975, and the financial
crises in Latin America and Asia in the 80s and 90s, the demand for fiscal disci-
pline became increasingly vociferous. For many cities around the world, this led
to the elimination or vast reduction of social services at the same time that it
locked in multiple forms of market-based neoliberal reforms.32
A new set of non-local institutions emerged to help restructure New York
27. LICHTEN,SUpra note 25, at 108.
28. Id.
29. See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 113; HACKWORTH,SUpra note 11, at 34.
30. It should be noted that the mayor and comptroller unsuccessfully requested federal relief at
several points during this period. See HACKWORTH, supra note 11, at 34.
31. ATTIAT F. OTT & JANG H. Yoo, NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAN THE TREND BE
REVERSED? 2 (1975).
32. See, e.g., CONTESTING NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN FRONTIERS (Helga Leitner, et al. eds., 2007).
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City's finances and labor policies. These included the Municipal Assistance Cor-
poration (MAC), the Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB), the Office of
the Special Deputy Comptroller for New York City (OSDC), and the Office of
New York City Finance in the U.S. Treasury Department.33 The MAC was au-
thorized to sell bonds for the city and both the MAC and the EFCB were run by
members of the financial elite. Of the nine members of the MAC board, for ex-
ample, eight had banking and brokerage connections. One of the main architects
of the city's "rescue" involved in both of these agencies was Felix Rohatyn, a part-
ner at the investment banking firm, Lazard Freres, and a director of ITT and six
other large corporations. Rohatyn designed many of the fiscal reform measures
prescribed for the city, and organized a three-year austerity plan involving major
cuts to the work force and to social services. This transition in governing power
has been referred to as a bankers' coup.34
The loss of democratic control over the city had numerous ramifications, but
none were as important as the changes in municipal spending priorities. The
MAC architects shifted funding away from sites of collective consumption and
towards business-friendly ventures in the areas of real estate, producer services,
banking, and insurance. 5 Elements of previous urban policy that came under at-
tack included City University of New York's (CUNY) policy of tuition-free edu-
cation, the city's subsidized housing, rent control, transportation subsidies, and
health facilities, especially with respect to welfare.36 Other targeted areas included
the unionized municipal workforce.
The conservative reasoning of the austerity program articulated the causes of
the city's "fiscal ill health," as primarily attributed to unionized labor, the poor,
and immigrants.37 Certainly, the greatest impact of the austerity measures was felt
by these groups:
Between January 1, 1975, and May 31, 1976, the city payroll was cut
by 15 percent, or 47,412 employees. Park and playground payrolls
were cut by 25 percent, the sanitation department by close to that,
and schools by slightly more.... The austerity program, as one might
have predicted, had a much greater impact on blacks and Puerto Ri-
33. See SHEFTER,supra note 24, at 133.
34. JACK NEWFIELD & PAUL Du BRUL, THE ABUSE OF POWER: THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT
AND THE FALL OF NEw YORK (1977).
35. See ROBERT FITCH, THE ASSASSINATION OF NEW YORK (1993).
36. See SHEFTER, supra note 24, at 147.
37. See, e.g., OTT & Yoo, supra note 31, at 16.
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cans than on other New Yorkers. In 1975, 15,000 teachers and para-
professionals-constituting 20 percent of union membership-were
laid off, and this reduced the proportion of black and Spanish-sur-
named teachers from 11 to 3 percent-remember that two-thirds of
the students are black or Spanish surnamed.... Between the fall of
1974 and the winter of 1976, the city workforce lost half its Spanish-
surnamed workers, two-fifths of its black male employees, and one-
third of its female employees.3"
The impact of the MAC plans were felt positively by the business community,
which experienced a resurgence in the late 1970s and 19 80s in areas such as real
estate, banking, and insurance.39 For example, manufacturing lofts were con-
verted into residential lofts in Manhattan throughout the 1970s. While a number
of new zoning resolutions, building codes, and tax incentives enabled this conver-
sion process, the most important by far was the 1975 revision of the J-51 program
to provide tax benefits for large-scale residential conversion. This was closely fol-
lowed by a 1976 zoning act that created TriBeCa and legalized residential conver-
sion in this area.40
The new development opportunities afforded by the MAC restructuring were
not just experienced in loft conversion but also in other forms of gentrification that
took place throughout the following decade.41 In Battery Park City, Times Square,
the Upper West Side, and South Street Seaport, among other hot spots, massive real
estate developments became emblematic of the new priorities of the MAC and the
EFCB managers following the city's earlier fiscal crisis. 42 In addition to local and
federal changes, global financial restructuring during this time also greatly facili-
tated the city's widespread gentrification as new forms of "securitization" enabled
real estate financing to connect to broader, non-local capital markets, leading to
what many have termed the first era of the "globalization of real estate." 3
38. See TABB, supra note 20, at 30.
39. See FITCH, supra note 35.
40. See ZUKIN,supra note 22, at 52.
41. See, e.g., NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST
CITY (1996); JANET ABU-LuGHOD, FROM URBAN VILLAGE TO EAST VILLAGE: BATTLE FOR NEW YORK'S
LOWER EAST SIDE (Janet L. Abu-Lughod ed., 1994).
42. See M. Christine Boyer, The City of Illusion: New York's Public Places, in THE RESTLESS
URBAN LANDSCAPE III (Paul L. Knox ed., 1993).
43. E.g., John Logan, Cycles and Trends in the Globalization of Real Estate, in THE RESTLESS
URBAN LANDSCAPE, supra note 42, at 33-39.
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The general financial boom and widespread gentrification of the 1980s was
accompanied by increasing social polarization in the city and rising homelessness,
among other social ills.44 The manifestation of these problems on the city streets
became more pronounced following the recession of the early 1990s and provided
the rationale for the incoming mayor, Rudy Giuliani, to introduce a harsh new
"zero tolerance" to urban "disorder," including homelessness.45
Rudy Giuliani was elected mayor of New York City in 1993 and again in
1997. Throughout his campaign and tenure in office, Giuliani stressed the capac-
ity of municipal leadership to bring about significant change: "Time brings all
things to pass, and with the start of my Administration New York City is poised
for dramatic change. The era of fear has had a long enough reign. The period of
doubt has run its course."'6 Under his regime, neoliberal policies of privatization,
cuts to social services, and new work rules intended to increase productivity were
implemented alongside increased policing, anti-homeless laws, and the harass-
ment of marginal populations. In particular, Giuliani sought to reduce taxes, trim
government and government expenditures (mainly through the privatization of
public resources), and decrease welfare benefits and caseloads. At the same time
that he stressed the need to cut back government employment and expenditures,
he repeatedly emphasized the need to reduce crime through aggressive law en-
forcement efforts.47 In his inaugural address, for example, Giuliani pledged to
place "much greater emphasis on stricter enforcement of the law to reverse the
growing trend of ever increasing tolerance for lawless behavior."'8 The institutions
created in the 197 0s, such as the MAC and the state's Financial Control Board,
44. See SMITH, supra note 41; MICHAEL J. DEAR & JENNIFER R. WOLCH, LANDSCAPES OF DESPAIR:
FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO HOMELESSNESS (1992).
45. For example, Giuliani declared a "fiscal emergency" in 1994, which helped legitimate fur-
ther slashes to the municipal workforce. Steven Lee Myers, Giuliani Outlines a Budget to Cut Gov-
ernment Size, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage
.htmlres=990DE5D61339F930A35751COA962958260.
46. Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Inauguration Speech (Jan. 2, 1994) (transcript available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/rwg/html/96/inaug.html) [hereinafter Giuliani Speech].
47. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING (2001); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 457 (2000); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance: A
Case Study of Police Policies and Practices in New York City, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 171,171-74 (1999);
Neil Smith, Giuliani Time: The Revanchist 1990s, 16:4 Soc. TEXT 1 (Winter 1998).
48. Giuliani Speech, supra note 46.
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were key players in legitimating these moves, and based their positive evaluations
of Giuliani's strong-arm tactics on the views of the rating agencies.
49
Many branches of municipal government that provided services for the poor
were cut dramatically under Giuliani (see Table 1). For example, the share of the
city budget allocated to the Department of Social Services declined from 23.8
percent in 1993 to 13.4 percent in 2001, a drop of 43.8 percent.50 In May 1998, for
example, Giuliani announced that he was firing half of the staff in the Depart-
ment of Homeless Services, with the long-term aim of closing the agency and
privatizing remaining services. 1 Although he did not entirely achieve this objec-
tive, the agency was significantly reduced during his tenure.12 Conversely, the pro-
portion of the budget allocated to the Police Department increased from 5.7
percent to 7.8 percent of the city budget.
At the same time that Mayor Giuliani reduced spending on many social ser-
vices for the poor, he encouraged the involvement of both non-profit and, even
more controversially, for-profit institutions in city services. In particular, Giuliani
sought to increase the involvement of profit-making firms in the provision of
transportation facilities, city property management, residential care for the elderly
and sick, prison health care, and homeless services. 53 For example, whereas seven
of New York City's homeless shelters were private in 1993, seventy-five of eighty-
two shelters had been privatized by 2000.14
49. See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 115. See also, James McKinley, Jr., Badillo Urges State to Study
City Budget: Calls for Intervention and Then Softens Stand, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at B1; James
McKinley, Making Do With Less: City Budget Faces Need for Services, N.Y. TMES, May 15, 1994, at
A33 (showing how ratings agencies exert significant pressures on communities to make cuts in
social spending and the workforce).
50. Giuliani also reduced expenditures for municipal hospitals (which serve the poor and unin-
sured) by 8.8% within the first six years. Lynne A. Weikart, The Giuliani Administration and the
New Public Management in New York City, 36 URB. AFF. REv. 359, 367-68 (2001).
51. Id. at 368-69.
52. Giuliani's policy responses to the homeless issues were generally constrained by the litigation
efforts of the Coalition of the Homeless and other advocacy groups. In the course of this litigation,
the Appellate Division of New York State Supreme Court ruled that under the state Constitution, all
homeless people have a right to shelter. See Donna Wilson Kirchheimer, Sheltering the Homeless in
New York City: Expansion in an Era of Government Contraction, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 607 (1989).
53. Weikart, supra note 50.
54. Giuliani also attempted but failed to terminate the city's rent control laws, and sought but
failed to sell three municipal hospitals to private companies. See id. at 375.
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Table 1. Change in New York City Budget Allocations, 1993-2001
1993 Budget 1993 2001 Budget 2001 Change in Propor-
Expenditures in Proportion of Expenditures in Proportion of tion of Budget
Dollars Budget Dollars Budget 1993-2001
Department of
Social Services 7,154,655,824 23.8447% 5,397,608,892 13.4005% -43.8%
Public
Assistance 309,299,725 1.0308% 279,947,592 0.6950% -32.6%
Department of
Homeless
Services 469,059,545 1.5633% 29,995,823 0.0745% -95.2%
City University 533,546,517 1.7782% 435,842,870 1.0821% -39.1%
Commission on
Human Rights 10,485,477 0.0349% 6,924,110 0.0172% -50.8%
Department of
Parks and
Recreation 155,472,070 0.5182% 191,228,168 0.4748% -8.4%
Police
Department 1,705,089,082 5.6826% 3,166,293,842 7.8608% +38.3%
Total Budget 30,005,203,638 100% 40,279,309,996 100%
SOURCE: The City of New York Executive Budget Fiscal Year 1994 (David Dinkins, Mayor) and The City
of New York Executive Budget Fiscal Year 2002 (Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mayor).
In addition to the loss of public funds for public resources and services, the
increased importance of private capital in the management of these services and
assets raises questions about democratic governance. New York City parks, for
example, are public spaces that are no longer controlled by public agencies, but are
increasingly managed by the private sector.5 Moreover, many private parks con-
servation and improvement efforts are spearheaded by Business Improvement
Districts (BIDs), which are now flourishing across the United States. 6 BIDs are
areas that vote to assess themselves additional fees in order to provide supplemen-
tary services in that area. Although heralded by Mayor Giuliani as "one of the
true success stories in the city" and "a tailor-made form of local government,""
BIDs are in some tension with democratic principles. As Margaret Kohn argues,
55. See SHARON ZUKIN, THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1995).
56. MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE (2004).
57. ZUKIN,SUpra note 55, at 34.
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First, the political influence in a Business Improvement District is
usually directly proportional to the value of one's property, thereby vi-
olating the democratic principle of one-person, one-vote. Second, BIDs
increase the impact of the already powerful business community on
local government. Finally, BIDs, as private, nonprofit organizations,
may be able to circumvent the constitutional provisions that require
local governments to protect the civil liberties of their citizens.58
In sum, while Giuliani was not able to achieve all of his fiscal policy objectives,
he significantly reduced government expenditures on services for the poor and pro-
moted privatization in several key areas, including public assistance, services for the
homeless, parks and recreation, and higher education. These budgetary shifts ad-
versely impacted poor people, increased the polarization of wealth in the city, and
enhanced the role of private entities, particularly corporations. 9 Giuliani himself
often vindicated his actions with reference to the city's bond-ratings, indicating that
positive ratings reflected market confidence in his cost-cutting practices."
Urban ills such as homelessness, panhandling, drug use, petty crime, squat-
ting, and illegal vending were targeted by Giuliani as security risks that should be
dealt with quickly and harshly. These "risks" implicitly brought together physical
fears of bodily injury (as a result of chaotic and lawless city streets) with fiscal
fears of declining ratings and an unmarketable city (literally unsecuritized streets).
The "[k]ey to attracting capital, tourists, and residents with disposable income is
the promotion of the city as a safe place to live, work, travel, and shop."6'
B. Zero Tolerance New York
Giuliani's cuts in government expenditures on social services stand in sharp
contrast to the enhanced budget and authority of the New York City Police Depart-
58. KOHN, supra note 56, at 85.
59. For example, the number of people receiving public assistance declined by almost half under
Giuliani, from 1,112,490 in 1993 to 518,823 in March 2001. In addition, food stamp participation
decreased by 26% between January 1996 and March 1999. See THE COMM. ON Soc. WELFARE LAW,
THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WELFARE REFORM IN NEW YORK CITY: THE
MEASURE OF SUCCEss, http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/reports/show-html.php? rid= 41 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2008).
60. Id.; see also Jonathan P. Hicks, Giuliani Tells Agencies to Use His Budget, Not the Councils,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at B3.
61. Alison Mountz & Winifred Curran, Policing in Drag: Rudy Giuliani, Mexico City, and
the Illusion of Control 6 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Alison Mountz).
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ment. Under Giuliani's leadership, the police department budget nearly doubled
from $1.7 billion in 1993 to $3.1 billion in 2000, a reflection of Giuliani's commit-
ment to fighting crime and disorder through enhanced law enforcement.
6
Giuliani's "zero tolerance" approach to crime and those he dubbed "disor-
derly" was based on "broken windows policing."63 Proponents of broken windows
policing argue that neighborhoods that fail to fix broken windows or address
other manifestations of "disorder" invite serious criminals into the neighbor-
hood.64 Proponents of this theory also argue that many of those who committed
minor offenses, like washing windows for tips, were in fact very dangerous indi-
viduals: "Squeegers were not merely a troubled population. They were capable of
considerable mayhem."65 Based on these assumptions, advocates of broken win-
dows policing called for a fundamental reorientation of policing, one that offered
city governments a broad and flexible means of regulating public spaces and re-
moving those deemed "disorderly." In particular, the police were encouraged to
consider misdemeanor offenses such as public drunkenness, prostitution, unli-
censed vending, and panhandling as very serious matters. The NYPD was also
encouraged to "stop and frisk" anyone deemed suspicious, a change that was, ac-
cording to police officials, quite popular among uniformed officers.
66
As a result of the implementation of this "tough" approach to crime and "dis-
order," the number of misdemeanor arrests increased about 80 percent, from ap-
proximately 129,403 in 1993 to 224,668 in 2000.67 Similarly, the number of drug
arrests more than doubled, from 66,744 in 1993 to 140,122 in 2000.68 Of these, a
growing percentage involved only marijuana: New York City marijuana arrests
rose from under 10,000 in 1993 to over 60,000 in 2000.69
The intensified enforcement of the laws prohibiting "quality of life" crimes had
62. See Greene, supra note 47, at 173-74.
63. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1982, at 29.
64. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 19-22 (1996);
WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS 36-50 (1992); Wilson & Kelling,supra note 63, at 29.
65. KELLING & COLES,supra note 64, at 142.
66. See WILLIAM J. BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND: How AMERICA'S Top Cop RE-
VERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998).
67. Greene,supra note 47, at 184. See also, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,
Adult Arrests, http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/years.htm (last visited June 12,
2008).
68. Greene, supra note 47, at 184.
69. Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New
York City, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 131, 139-45 (2007).
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a pronounced impact on the city's homeless population, as many were arrested in
the new effort to crack down on "disorder."' In some cases, it seemed that the police
went out of their way to harass the homeless. For example, undercover police offi-
cers began riding the M35 bus to arrest those on their way to shelters who did not
pay the $2 fare. In 1999, Police Commissioner Howard Saffir announced that home-
less people sleeping outside would be summonsed or arrested for disorderly conduct.
In response to public outcry, Giuliani argued that "[the right to sleep in the streets]
doesn't exist anywhere. The founding fathers never put that in the Constitution."7
At the same time, Giuliani tried to change city rules to require that homeless people
who did not comply with welfare-to-work requirements, treatment protocols, and
other rules be barred from the entire city shelter system for at least thirty days.72
Also under Giuliani's leadership, street vendors-an overwhelmingly immi-
grant and poor population-were subjected to enhanced regulation, sanctions,
and seizure of assets. In his first year as mayor, arrests for illegal vending increased
by 38 percent; summonses for illegal vending increased by 40 percent; and sei-
zures of vendors' property increased by 37 percent.73 In 1996, at the urging of
BIDs, Giuliani created the Street Vendor Review Panel which also sought to re-
strict the spaces in which street vendors could operate. In 1998, Giuliani success-
fully advocated for a law that banned street vendors from 144 of the most favorable
blocks and intersections.74
In short, Giuliani sought to create order and enhance the quality of urban life
by downsizing government, particularly government agencies that served the poor,
promoting privatization, and intensifying law enforcement efforts and authority. A
number of new "sticks" were introduced to ensure compliance with Giuliani's vi-
sion of an orderly and secure city, and the vast majority of these tactics were wielded
against the city's most vulnerable residents. The practices and policies enacted in
New York City have been vigorously promoted by Giuliani Partners and other
70. See HARCOURT, supra note 47, at 165-66; Heather Barr, Policing Madness: People with Mental
Illness and the NYPD, in ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN
NEW YORK CITY 50, 53 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001); Peter A. Barta, Giuliani, Bro-
ken Windows and the Right to Beg, 6 GEo. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 165, 168-69 (1999); Elisabeth
Bumiller, In Wake of Attack, Giuliani Cracks Down on Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1999, at Al.
71. Bumiller, supra note 70, at Al.
72. See Barr, supra note 70, at 62.
73. Rudolph W. Giuliani & William J. Bratton, Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the Public
Spaces of New York, OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, 1994 (data derived from author's research notes of ar-
chival material available at the New York City Municipal Archive); see also MITCHELL DUNFIER,
SIDEWALK 231-52 (1999) (discussing the regulation of street vendors).
74. See Smith, supra note 47, at 14.
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transnational global security consulting firms, as well as by U.S.-based bond-rating
agencies. In what follows, we consider the exportation of this type of fiscal disciplin-
ing and rationality through bond-ratings judgments and global security partner-
ships operating in Mexico and Mexico City in particular.
III. EXPORTING NEOLIBERALISM
A. Disciplining Mexico
The rise of global finance systems have resulted in new kinds of controls over
the scoring and movement of credit worldwide.75 These agents and institutions of
credit are implicated in shifting forms of governance, with previously centralized
systems of authority now relocated in multiple directions and in many new forms of
public-private partnerships. 76 With respect to metropolitan governance, especially in
developing countries, the globalization of finance, and in particular the influence of
credit ratings by international corporations such as Moody's and S&P, has had a sig-
nificant impact on urban autonomy and policy.77 The agencies have influence over a
capital market environment fearful of risk, and they often determine-through the
allocation of credit-the development options of an entire city or nation.78
Mayors, bureaucrats, and local politicians are all deeply aware of the implica-
tions of credit ratings for their personal careers and for their constituencies, and
thus adapt to and adopt the social and economic adjustments demanded by these
U.S.-based agencies. Giselle Datz writes, "[A] serious implication of rating agen-
cies' influence on international capital markets today is not only to be found in
their influencing of private investors, but in their influencing of developing coun-
tries' governments, which tie policy making to the quasi veto power of ratings."79
Thus the power of ratings in developing economics comes from their entry into
75. See TONY PORTER, GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCE (2005).
76. See Martin Hewson & Timothy J. Sinclair, The Emergence of Global Governance Theory, in AP-
PROACHES TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THEORY 3, 7 (1999); RANDALL D. GERMAIN, THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF CREDIT: STATES AND GLOBAL FINANCE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1997).
77. See SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 1-2; HACKWORTH,SUpra note 11, at 23-29.
78. Attracting private sector capital investment has become increasingly vital for almost all de-
velopment sectors in emerging economies. Over the past two decades, private sector investment in
developing countries rose from $45 billion to $300 billion. By contrast, official sector capital invest-
ment rose only from $30 billion to $80 billion over the same time period. See Lynn Selhat, How
Private Financiers See Development: High Risk, High Return, OECD OBSERVER, Oct. 2000, at 45.
79. Giselle Datz, Refraining the Development and Accountability: The Influence of Sovereign
Credit Ratings on Policy Making in Developing Countries, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 303, 304 (2004).
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the calculations of policy makers of every political hue and at every scale of gover-
nance. Further, the highly subjective notion of risk encourages submission to "ex-
pert" knowledge, which is often required by insurance companies and other
financial entities and in turn impacts the behavior and thinking of urban politi-
cians. In the case of S&P, Moody's Investor Services, and Fitch, this expert knowl-
edge is predicated on a firm belief in the efficacy and necessity of U.S.-style neoliberal
market reforms. For example, after Vicente Fox Quesada was elected President of
Mexico in 2000, S&P indicated a positive outlook for a ratings upgrade (to invest-
ment grade) if the administration followed certain guidelines such as ending deficit
spending, strengthening the banking system, and reducing state control of key eco-
nomic sectors, particularly energy. "It really is a question of how effective we think
the Fox administration is going to be in implementing the structural reform agenda,"
said John B. Chambers, deputy head of the sovereign ratings group at S&P.80
In Mexican cities and financial circles, the impact of credit ratings agencies has
been strongly felt since the deepening integration with the U.S. economy, symbol-
ized most concretely by the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1993.81 In that same year, S&P acquired CAVAL, a Mexican credit
ratings agency, and subsequently offered bullish assessments of Mexico's economic
prospects just prior to the national elections and the devaluation of the peso and fi-
nancial crisis of 1994-95.2 This (mistakenly) positive assessment coincided with a
strong marketing push by S&P in Mexico. Six years later, Moody's projected similar
bullish assessments for Mexico, raising the country's ratings from junk to invest-
ment grade status, also just prior to a presidential election. 3 With this move, Moody's
virtually guaranteed a wealth of post-election contracts, but also raised the thorny
question of a conflict of interest. "Moody's announcement was widely praised by the
Mexican government and sparked a rally in local bond and equity markets, bolster-
ing Moody's chances of winning mandates for a long queue of government entities
and corporations planning to issue bonds in the ensuing months."84
80. Anthony De Palma, Mexico Victor Faces Choices on Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at Cl.
See also John Authers, Mexico Sees S&P Ratings Upgrade, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at 27; John Au-
thers and Sara Silver, Debt Rating Upgrade Gives Boost to Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8,2002, at 6.
81. See Credit Ratings, with their Awesome Power, Come to Mexico, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Jan.
1994, at 112-13.
82. Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Rating Agencies: Is there an Agency Issue? 41 (Stern School of
Business, New York University Working Paper, Feb. 18, 2001 draft) available at http://wwwl
.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/RatingAgencies.pdf.
83. See Graham Field, Going Separate Ways, LATIN FIN., Feb. 2001, at 18-19.
84. Smith & Walter, supra note 82, at 41.
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The articulation of corporate profit-making by the ratings agencies with pol-
icy directives advocating neoliberal reforms such as privatization, austerity, and
integration with the U.S. economy, indicates a few of the challenges to urban au-
tonomy that confront politicians in developing countries. Ratings directives per-
meate all scales of governance and are linked with the political fortunes of parties
and individual actors. As with the financial crisis in New York City in the 197 0s,
the "fiscal discipline" advocated and monitored by the credit agencies is increas-
ingly imposed on developing cities and regions from above, in this case from both
national and international institutions and directives."
This has been the case for Mexico City, a stronghold of the leftist PRD (Demo-
cratic Revolution Party) party since the mid 1990s. The center-right PRI (Institutional
Revolutionary Party) and rightist PAN (National Action Party) parties at the national
scale have largely dictated many of the spending priorities for the city, as well as en-
couraging the never-ending "war on drugs," which has led to the targeting of poor
areas, harassment of the population in these neighborhoods and, frequently, their sub-
sequent gentrification.16 These practices and policies are often rationalized and legiti-
mated with reference to the priorities of global institutions, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as private investors and the financial
instruments they rely on to delineate risk, such as S&P, Moody's, and Fitch.87
Lopez Obrador, who served as mayor of Mexico City before running for Presi-
dent in 2006, instituted large public works projects and a number of social programs
in the city, including a government pension program for the elderly.88 When it ap-
peared that he might win the presidential election, worry about future undisciplined
government spending caused havoc in the bond market.89 This concern was alleviated
somewhat by Obrador's "Cambridge-educated" economic adviser, Rogelio Ramirez
85. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 16 (1996).
86. See Sam Enriquez & Carlos Martinez, Mexico City 'Narco-neighborhood' is Targeted, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at A4; Mexico Politics: Crime Watch, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Nov. 2,
2006.
87. The link between drug-related violence and threats to foreign investment is made repeat-
edly in speeches by national figures such as Calderon. See Hector Tobar & Cecilia Sanchez, Toll
Mounts in Mexico's Drug War, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at A4; see also Mexico Politics: Law and
No Order, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Oct. 9, 2006, at 3 (suggesting that the most significant
impact on foreign direct investment is yet to come).
88. E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexico's Leftist Candidate Walks Fine Line Between Free-Market, Social-
ist Policies, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 7, 2006.
89. See Adriana Arai, Worry About Candidate Hurts Bonds in Mexico, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June
26, 2006, at 15 ("Bonds from Mexico's biggest corporate borrowers have fallen more than debt of
other Latin American companies on concern that a presidential candidate who has promised to
increase spending to fight poverty could win the national election Sunday.").
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de la 0, who assured the private sector that Obrador would not bring a new economic
model to Mexico." Moody's Latin America analyst, Alfredo Coutino, also tamed con-
cerns about financial risk related to an Obrador victory: "The markets outside of
Mexico, especially in the United States, see that Lopez Obrador's proposal isn't that
bad and that he doesn't represent a risk to the free-market model.""' Nevertheless, at
least one company located in Mexico City, America Movil, had its bonds decline by 9.7
percent at this time, partially as a result of political fears. "'Why do I want a small
yield pickup on America Movil when I can just hold a high-quality corporate for the
same amount, without the political risk?' asked Teresa Kong, a senior portfolio man-
ager for Barclays Global Investors, in an interview from San Francisco."92
Leftist mayors like Obrador and his successor, Marcelo Ebrard, find themselves
caught between their political promises of local spending for needed social services
and the all-important movement of bond values and ratings operating on a transna-
tional scale. Their desperate desire to maintain strong relations with U.S.-dominated
agencies frequently leads to municipal policies at odds with their stated mandates of
poverty alleviation, including new "security measures" intended to drive drug smug-
glers and sidewalk merchants out of particular neighborhoods. For example, in
Tepito, a poor neighborhood in the center of Mexico City that was the target of a
police "drug-busting" raid in February 2007, evicted residents told reporters they
felt "betrayed," and hung an effigy of Ebrard in protest.93
For many mayors such as Ebrard, the increasingly global rhetoric of law and order
and zero tolerance relating to physical security, has become intrinsically linked with
financial security. This is particularly evident in the tourist industry and particularly
in historic centers of cities such as Mexico City. The war on drugs often takes place in
neighborhoods like Tepito which are near tourist-oriented urban spaces; the harass-
ment and/or eviction of the residents of these spaces makes the streets safer for visitors
and also opens up these neighborhoods to financial speculation and gentrification.94
How have mayors like Ebrard learned about law and order policing, and who is
90. Castillo, supra note 88.
91. Leftist's Vacillations Hampering Him in Mexican Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 15, 2006.
92. Arai,supra note 89, at 15.
93. Enriquez & Martinez, supra note 86, at A9.
94. See Claudia Boyd-Barrett, Authorities Announce Yet Another New Unit of Specialized Police,
EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE, Dec. 17,2002 ("For the benefit of those just stopping over in Mex-
ico City, new multi-lingual Tourist Police keep a watchful eye over the capital's much-visited His-
toric Center. With a similar mandate, horse-backed 'Traditional Police' in mariachi hats and
embroidered jackets patrol the famous Alameda park a few blocks away from the central square,
combining tourist entertainment with crime-fighting.").
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profiting from the rise of this new form of securitization of cities? We address these
questions through an examination of the transnational exportation of zero tolerance
rhetoric from New York City and the rise of global security partnerships worldwide.
B. The Export of Zero Tolerance
Advocates and opponents of zero tolerance policing agree on at least one thing:
the New York approach to crime is often portrayed as a model for cities across the
United States and around the globe.95 Although many academic critics argue that
Giuliani's crime policies had little to do with the crime drop in New York City,
Giuliani routinely takes, and is given, credit for making New York City safe again.
"Giuliani has become the international face of zero tolerance policing, having been
credited with making New York the safest big city in America through his crack-
down on "squeegee men," noise, pedestrians and street vendors." 96
Within the United States, the gospel has been spread primarily by former
NYPD Commissioner William Bratton (now Chief of Police in Los Angeles),
Mayor Giuliani, the Manhattan Institute, and the mass media, which routinely
attributes the crime drop in New York to changes in NYPD practices. Many Eu-
ropean political leaders, as well as officials from Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa, have visited NYPD headquarters and incorporated much of the
rhetoric, if not the practice, of zero tolerance in their home countries.
Zero tolerance policing has had a notable impact on debates over policing in
Latin America as a result of ongoing efforts by consulting organizations to pro-
mote the "New York model." 7 The recent experience of Giuliani Partners in
Mexico City illustrates how politicians may be induced to look to NYC for a solu-
tion to their problems for many reasons, including: popular concern about crime
and violence, city officials' desire to maintain positive credit ratings and attract
foreign investment, and business leaders' willingness to fund against crime."8
95. See, e.g., Christian Parenti, The Revolution in American Policing: The Science of Kicking Ass,
Z MAG., Dec. 1997; Charles Sahm, New York Revitalizes U.S. Policing, CITY J., Winter 2005, at 18;
Loic Wacquant, The 'Scholarly Myths' of the New Law and Order Doxa, in SOCIALIST REGISTER
2OO6: TELLING THE TRUTH 93, 99 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2005).
96. Mountz & Curran, supra note 61, at 10.
97. See Loic Wacquant, Toward a Dictatorship over the Poor? Notes on the Penalization of Poverty
in Brazil, 5 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 197, 198 (2003).
98. See Jens Erik Gould, High Crime Stifles Latin Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at Cl.
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C. Giuliani Partners in Mexico City
After being declared America's "top cop" by Time Magazine in 1996, New
York Police Chief Bratton stepped down from public office and formed his own
private consulting company, The Bratton Group, L.L.C. The consulting group
has worked on four continents, offering consulting services that promote, among
other things, zero tolerance policing. At a time when neoliberal institutions such
as the World Bank and bond-rating agencies, as well as foreign investors them-
selves, express heightened concern about crime and insecurity, municipal leaders
feel compelled to take action-any action-in South America, where he has ad-
vised officials on both crime policy and running on an anti-crime platform.99
Similarly, upon retiring from the mayor's office, Rudy Giuliani formed Giuliani
Partners, a consulting organization staffed by many of his top aides from City
Hall and former police commissioner Bernard Kerik.""'
In 2002, Giuliani Partners signed a $4.3 million contract to advise Mexico
City officials in their efforts to reduce crime. Notably, however, Giuliani did not
contract with the city, but with the man who put up the funds for the lucrative
contract, Carlos Slim Heru, the wealthiest man in Latin America. 1 ' As one jour-
nalist put it, "The formula is largely the same, except that this time Giuliani
wasn't elected. He was not hired by any public agency or official.."' 1 2 More surpris-
ing was the fact that the consulting arrangement had the blessing of the leftist
Mayor Lopez Obrador, who was reportedly concerned about the negative impact
of the crime problem on plans to revitalize parts of the city, as well as widespread
popular frustration about crime, violence, and police corruption. 3
The contract was announced with much fanfare and media hype. A year
after signing the contract, and after several delays, Giuliani's firm presented 146
recommendations to the municipality. These recommendations were wide-rang-
99. In 2000, Kroll Associates, a leader in the private security consulting industry, announced that
it has signed an agreement with The Bratton Group L.L.C. "to provide public safety-focused ad-
ministration, training and operational re-engineering and analysis consulting services to Kroll's
clients worldwide." Press Release, Kroll Associates, Kroll Associates Announces Signing of Agree-
ment with Former New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton and the Bratton Group
LLC (Nov. 2, 2000), available at http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release ?id= 12346.
100. Mountz & Curran,supra note 61, at 16.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Noah Friedsky, Giuliani's Mexico City Game: A Story of Fear, Power, and Money, NARCO
NEws BULL., Sept. 11, 2003, at 1.
103. See Jordi Pius Llopart, Robocop in Mexico City, NACLA REP. ON THE AM., Sept.-Oct. 2003,
at 22.
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ing, and included the recommendation to develop and use Compstat, °4 install
cameras and lighting, enhance police training, use breathalyzers to enforce laws
against drunk driving, and target illegal street vendors and windshield washers. °5
The recommendations, particularly those involving the criminalization of street
vendors, were controversial from the start. A leading Mexican criminologist, Ra-
fael Ruiz-Harrell, announced that "[z]ero tolerance is a useless concept in
Mexico."1"6 Many commentators worried that Giuliani's zeal to "clean up" the
streets would essentially criminalize the many people who participate in Mexico
City's informal economy. Whereas New York officials estimated that about two
hundred people were working as "squeegee guys" in New York City when the
crackdown on window washing began in that city, an estimated twenty thousand
people-mostly street children-survived by washing windows in Mexico City.'
0 7
Critics also worried that the rhetoric associated with zero tolerance would
exacerbate the already severe problem of police violence, and pointed out that
many of the recommendations could not be implemented without modifying the
Mexican Constitution. 10 8 Still others objected to the idea of relying on the police to
solve economic problems:
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the [Giuliani] approach is the
pressure it places on the police to solve problems that are largely
beyond its competence to resolve ... Mexico City's hundreds of
thousands offraneleros, windshield wipers and ambulatory vendors
are a reflection of a massive informal sector that has no real coun-
terpart in New York ... [t]heir significant presence is virtually
guaranteed by the weaknesses and inequities in the District's econ-
omy and local public administration.'0 9
The long-term impact of Mexico City's consultation with Giuliani Partners
104. Compstat stands for "Computer Statistics," and allows for spatial analysis of criminal events
in order to identify "hot spots." See generally ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK MURDER MYSTERY:
THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CRIME CRASH OF THE 199os (2000).
105. See Daniela Gerson, In Mexico City, Few Cheers for Giuliani, THE N.Y. SUN, Apr. 11, 2005 at 1.
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on crime policy is unclear. On the one hand, many of Giuliani Partners' recom-
mendations appear to have been largely ignored. Window washers and mobile
street vendors, for example, continue to work in the streets without substantial
risk of arrest. On the other hand, some of its recommendations were implemented:
the police placed "panic buttons" on city buses and installed surveillance cameras
in high crime areas. Bail was also increased for many offenders, thus exacerbating
the problem of jail overcrowding. Even before the release of the report, the Mexico
City Legislative Assembly, inspired by the spirit of zero tolerance, toughened pen-
alties for a number of minor offenses and mandated that those who commit petty
theft (including snacking on store food while shopping) receive at least six months
in jail."' This new "Law of Civic Culture" also increased the penalties for other
common violations-including leaving dog excrement on the street, dumping
furniture, asking for a tip for "fire-eating" (common among street children), and
prostitution. After a long dispute regarding the constitutionality of its provisions,
the law was very recently upheld by the Supreme Court of Mexico, a ruling that
clears the way for other municipalities to adopt similar legislation. "'
This expanded definition of crime provides the police with yet another method
for extortion, and leaves open the possibility that these laws will be enforced under
particular circumstances or locales."2 Indeed, it appears that the main legacy of Giu-
liani's work has been felt in Mexico City's historic district, now the site of major
"urban renewal" (i.e., gentrification) efforts. Interviews with expert and non-expert
residents of Mexico City revealed a widespread perception that Giuliani's policies
were implemented only "in the tourist zones." Notably, the billionaire who fronted
the cash for Giuliani's contract, had previously acquired many properties in these
areas, properties he was busily converting to loft apartments."3
In the end, Giuliani Partners was paid less than its widely reported $4.3 mil-
lion fee, and its contract was not renewed. Mexico City's new police chief, Joel
Ortega, announced in 2005 that he is "no fan of Giuliani. '11 4 The plan did little to
improve the quality of life for the millions of Mexico City's poor residents, and
may have rendered their lives more difficult by enhancing police power without
addressing poverty or police corruption. Under the new leadership of former po-
110. See Guthrie, supra note 107, at 45.
111. Interview with Mario Arroyo Juarez, Director, Sistemas de Informaci6n para la Seguridad
Humana, SC. (March 29, 2007) [herinafter Juarez Interview].
112. See Jo Tuckman, Zero Tolerance? My Money's on the Traffic Light Fire-Eaters, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 23, 2004, at 21.
113. Mountz & Curran,supra note 61, at 14.
114. Gerson,supra note 105.
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lice chief turned Mayor Marcelo Ebrard, city officials now seek inspiration from
cities that have adopted less punitive crime-fighting techniques, including Pal-
ermo, Italy and Bogotdi, Columbia.11 5 While the impact of Giuliani Partners in
Mexico City has been less drastic than Giuliani's detractors feared, this has largely
been the result of political opposition to the plan. It remains quite possible that the
export of zero tolerance to other Latin American cities could have much more
long-lasting and negative repercussions. Indeed, after completing his report to
Carlos Slim Heru, Giuliani Partners has engaged in "partnerships" in countries
throughout Latin America, Europe, and the African subcontinent.
CONCLUSION
In this article we show how two key transnational private institutions-bond-
rating agencies and the crime consulting industry-increasingly influence urban
space and policy. Although transnational in orientation, each was born in the United
States and continues to promote U.S. interests and priorities. Private, undemocratic,
and lacking accountability, these institutions now have a significant impact on the
governance of municipalities around the globe. Working together, bond-rating
agencies and crime consulting organizations encourage fiscal and social discipline
and a general enhancement of the state's coercive power over those who are poor,
homeless, and consigned to the informal sector. These institutions also encourage a
weakening of democratic rights-rights to political participation, representation,
and public accountability-as well as a deterioration of human rights to food, hous-
ing, dignity, and general welfare protection by the state.
The negative results of Giuliani Partners' work in Mexico City underscores
the importance and viability of political resistance to global neoliberalism and its
institutional handmaidens. Although powerful, the impact of these institutions
will ultimately be determined in the course of political struggle.
115. Juarez Interview,supra note 111.
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